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QUESTIONS PRESENTED
I.
II.

Does the individual right to possess firearms extend beyond the home?
If so, is the good cause requirement a permissible limitation on an individual’s right to
possess a concealed firearm in public?
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PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS
Petitioner, Alexandra Hamilton, was the plaintiff before the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Columbia, and the appellee before the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourteenth Circuit.
Respondents, County of Burr and Joan Adams, were the defendants before the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Columbia, and the appellants before the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourteenth Circuit.
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CITATIONS TO THE OPINIONS BELOW
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Columbia’s Opinion and
Order Granting Petitioner’s Motion for Summary Judgment is unpublished. (R. at 7). The
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourteenth Circuit’s Opinion and Order reversing the
lower court’s decision is unpublished. (R. at 14).
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The court of appeals entered judgment on July 1, 2017. (R. at 19). Petitioner timely filed
a Petition for Writ of Certiorari which was granted on November 13, 2017. (R. at 20). This
Court’s jurisdiction rests on 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) (2012).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court reviews a district court’s fact findings for clear error and its legal conclusions
de novo.
PROVISIONS INVOLVED
“A well-regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the
people to keep and bear arms, shall not be infringed.” U.S. Const. amend. II.
Columbia Penal Code § 900 (2015).

vi

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Alexandra Hamilton’s (“Hamilton”) son was severely beaten and robbed during a violent
home invasion in the home they share. (R. at 3). As a result of the attack, Hamilton’s son
sustained permanent spinal injuries which required extensive rehabilitation treatment. (R. at 3).
The attacker was subsequently captured, convicted, and sentenced to five years in prison. (R. at
3). Although she was not present during the incident, Hamilton developed a paralyzing fear of
men with tattoos, who reminded her of her son’s attacker. (R. at 3). Hamilton, a fifty-six-yearold single mother, regularly works the night shift as a front desk receptionist at the Trenton
Motel. (R. at 3). Despite therapy, she continued to fear home invasions and possible attacks,
particularly at the motel where she often works alone. (R. at 3).
Emotionally affected by the incident, Hamilton applied for a Permit to Carry a Concealed
Weapon (“CCW Permit”). (R. at 24). In order to qualify for a permit, Columbia requires
applicants to demonstrate “good cause” before issuing a handgun permit. (R. at 21). After
completing the required firearms training course, a thorough background check, and
demonstrating that she or a family member was in harm’s way, Columbia granted Hamilton’s
CCW Permit. (R. 25).
One evening, Hamilton accompanied her son to his rehabilitation treatment. (R. at 4).
While Hamilton stood alone outside the rehabilitation facility, George Cornwallis, a thirty-threeyear-old man with tattoos and facial piercings, approached her seeking directions to the facility’s
inpatient wing. (R. at 4). Fearful and startled by the man’s striking resemblance to her son’s
attacker, Hamilton retrieved her concealed pistol and pointed it at Cornwallis, but did not fire.
(R. at 4). Cornwallis, a trained off-duty police officer, disarmed Hamilton. (R. at 4). Because
Hamilton inadvertently left her CCW Permit at home, she was cited for failing to produce proper
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identification in violation of CPC § 900.1(C). (R. at 4). Burr County (“the County”)
subsequently revoked Hamilton’s permit. (R. at 4).
Hamilton subsequently sued the County in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Columbia. (R. at 2–6). In her complaint, Hamilton vehemently argued that
Columbia’s good cause statute violated her Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms. (R.
at 4). Agreeing with Hamilton, the district court granted her motion for summary judgment,
holding that the good cause requirement is unconstitutional. (R. at 12). The County appealed to
the Fourteenth Circuit Court of Appeals. (R. at 14). On appeal, the Fourteenth Circuit reversed
the district court’s decision. (R. at 14–19). Hamilton filed a petition for writ of certiorari with
this Court which was rightfully granted. (R. at 20).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
The right to keep and bear arms for the purposes of self-defense is a fundamental right
guaranteed by the Second Amendment. However, this Court has not clarified whether the right
to carry firearms extends beyond the home. Nevertheless, the thorough textual, and historical
exegesis in Heller and recent circuit court decisions, confirms that an individual’s right to selfdefense is not confined to the home. The plain meaning of the right to “keep and bear arms”
simply means to “carry” and “possess” weapons in case of confrontation. As Heller noted, the
Framers feared the possibility of federal tyranny and demanded on adopting the Bill of Rights
before ratifying the Constitution. Including the Second Amendment in the Bill of Rights
empowered the people from the possibility of government tyranny. Additionally, self-defense is
a “central component” entrenched within the Second Amendment, and any attempt to impede
that right violates the Constitution.
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Columbia’s good cause requirement infringes on core Second Amendment conduct.
Statutes and regulations that impermissibly encroach on constitutional protections are subject to
different standards of review. However, because Columbia’s good cause requirement creates a
substantial burden on Second Amendment conduct, it is a complete ban. And complete bans
always fail any level of scrutiny. Even if Columbia’s good cause requirement is not a ban, it
unquestionably infringes on a core component of the Second Amendment and fails strict
scrutiny. Furthermore, Hamilton’s need to defend her son and herself greatly outweighs any
State interest and fails the intermediate scrutiny test. Accordingly, Columbia’s good cause
requirement impermissibly infringes on Hamilton’s Second Amendment right, and is
unconstitutional.
ARGUMENTS
The Second Amendment provides that “a well-regulated Militia, being necessary to the
security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear arms, shall not be infringed.”
U.S. Const. amend. II. This Court has held that the Second Amendment unquestionably protects
an individual right to possess a firearm for self-defense, unrelated to militia service. District of
Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008). Two years later, this Court justly declared that the
Second Amendment is a protected fundamental right. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S.
742, 745 (2010). The question remains whether the right to keep and bear arms for self-defense
extends beyond the home. See Wrenn v. District of Columbia, 864 F.3d 650, 467 (D.C. Cir.
2017). The Second Amendment inarguably protects an individual right to defend himself in
public. See Wrenn, 864 F.3d at 657; Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865 (4th Cir. 2013);
Kachalsky v. County of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 2012); Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d
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933 (7th Cir. 2012). Furthermore, the Columbia good cause statute impermissibly limits this
individual right.
I.

THE INDIVIDUAL RIGHT TO POSSESS FIREARMS EXTENDS BEYOND THE
HOME.
This Court has held that the right to possess a firearm is a fundamental right guaranteed

by the Second Amendment. McDonald, 561 U.S. at 745. It is necessary to protect fundamental
rights to ensure the protection of individual liberty, free from “restraint or interference of others.”
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968). Additionally, protecting liberty and individual rights is not
confined to the home, but must “extend[] beyond spatial bounds.” Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S.
558, 562 (2003); see also Terry, 392 U.S. at 9 (opining that the Fourth Amendment
unquestionably protects individuals from unlawful search and seizures inside the home and while
“walk[ing] down the street”). Although Heller posits that the need for defense of self and
property is most acute in the home, text, history and precedent illustrate this right also
unequivocally applies where these needs are less acute. See Heller, 544 U.S. at 628.
A. The Second Amendment Guarantees a Fundamental Right to Keep and Bear
Arms for Purposes of Self-Defense.
Traditionally, the Bill of Rights only applied to the Federal Government. McDonald, 561
U.S. at 754. However, constitutional amendments preceding the Civil War dramatically altered
our federal system. Id. By the nineteenth century, this Court held that the Due Process Clause
expressly prohibits States from infringing individual Bill of Rights protections. Id. at 759. The
new standard was whether any of the Bill of Rights protections were fundamental to our Nation’s
scheme of “liberty and system of justice.” Id. at 764. Subsequently, this Court held that almost
all of the Bill of Rights met the necessary standard of protection. Id.
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Surprisingly, the Second Amendment was never declared a fundamental right until
McDonald was decided. Id. at 754. To determine whether the Second Amendment is a
fundamental right, this Court considered whether that right was deeply rooted in “our Nation’s
history and tradition.” Id. at 764. Using a textual and historical analysis, this Court affirmatively
answered this question. Heller, 554 U.S. at 576.
1. The plain meaning of the “right to keep and bear arms” ensures an individual
right to carry and possess weapons in case of confrontation.
The Constitution was written using words and phrases used normally by voters, which
provided easy comprehension without the possibility of secrets or technical meanings. Id. at
577. The “right to keep and bear arms” suggests distinction between the words “keep” and
“bear.” Id. at 581. “Arms” is defined as “weapons of offense,” which were not designed for
military use or employed in any military capacity. Id. The word “keep” is most understood as
“to hold” or retain “in one’s power or possession.” Id. at 582. Thus, a logical reading of “keep
arms” is to “have weapons.” Id. As Heller clarified, “keep arms” simply referred to possessing
firearms, “for militiamen and everyone else.” Id. at 583.
The term “bear,” as understood at the founding, meant to “carry.” Additionally, the word
“bear,” when used in conjunction with “arms,” connotes “carrying with a particular purpose.”
Id. The “particular purpose,” recognized in Heller, is the purpose of individual self-defense. Id.
at 590. When taken together, the text of the Second Amendment guarantees an individual right
to “carry” and “possess” weapons in case of confrontation. Id.
2. The second amendment is deeply rooted in our nation’s history.
The right to keep and bear arms is an important part of individual freedom that predates
the Constitution. Heller, 554 U.S. at 603. Historically, rulers narrowly limited the right of the
people to keep and bear arms to prevent resistance. Id. at 606. The Framers feared the

5

possibility that a new government would encroach on their right to keep and bear arms and
insisted on adopting the Bill of Rights before ratifying the Constitution. McDonald, 561 U.S. at
769. The Second Amendment’s ratification proposed to empower the people from the possibility
of federal usurpation. 554 U.S. at 609. Although the threat of federal tyranny diminished, the
right to keep and bear arms remained an essential value for “purposes of self-defense.”
McDonald, 561 U.S. at 770.
Following the Civil War, Congress debated whether newly free slaves were entitled to
constitutional protection, including the Second Amendment. 554 U.S. at 614. Southern States
frequently disarmed blacks. Id. Their inability to defend themselves resulted in many innocent
blacks slaughtered by armed white men. McDonald, 561 U.S. at 757. Anti-slavery advocates
often challenged these injustices by invoking the right to bear arms for self-defense. 554 U.S. at
608. Congress eventually adopted the “Freedmen’s Bureau Act” which secured blacks the right
to keep and bear arms for the purposes of self-defense. Id. at 615–16. The history of the Second
Amendment illustrates that the need for self-protection is deeply rooted in our Nation’s tradition.
See McDonald, 561 U.S. 742; Heller, 554 U.S. 570.
B. Self-Defense is a Central Component Entrenched Within the Second
Amendment.
In Heller, this Court emphasized that the right to self-defense is a “central component”
within the Second Amendment. Heller, 554 U.S. 570. Because Heller was limited to the home,
a continuing issue exists as to whether the Second Amendment right extends beyond the home.
See Wrenn, 864 F.3d at 657. A majority of circuits believe the Second Amendment is not
confined to the home. 864 F.3d at 657; Moore, 702 F.3d 933 (reasoning that although this Court
has not explicitly identified a right to carry firearms in public, it is possible to imply such a
right); Woollard, 712 F.3d 865 (concluding that the Second Amendment exists outside the
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home); Kachalsky, 701 F.3d 81 (expressing that the Second Amendment must have some
application to public possession of firearms).
Recently, the D.C. Circuit struck down the District of Columbia’s good cause statute.
Wrenn, 864 F.3d at 655. In Wrenn, the court held that carrying weapons for self-defense falls
within the “core” of the Second Amendment, therefore any restriction on that right to carry arms
violates the Second Amendment. Id. at 657. Similar to Columbia’s good cause requirement, the
District required applicants to demonstrate a special need for carrying a firearm in public. Id. at
656. The court opined that self-defense is not confined to a person’s home, but necessary outside
the home as well. Id. The Wrenn Court concluded that the right to keep and bear arms stand
equally, giving law-abiding citizens means to exercise each. Id. at 663. Similarly, the Seventh
Circuit struck down Illinois’s version of the good cause requirement. Moore, 702 F.3d at 934.
In Moore, the court addressed the issue of whether the Illinois good cause requirement violated
the Second Amendment right to bear arms for self-defense outside the home. Id. The court
reasoned that the right to keep and bear arms cannot possibly be limited to one’s home because
confrontations may arise outside the home. Id. at 936. Moreover, strictly applying “bearing”
arms to one’s home would be “awkward usage.” Id. The court concluded that the right to bear
arms insinuates a right to carry a gun outside the home. Id.
Hamilton’s unfortunate situation exemplifies an individual’s need to protect themselves
outside their home. See id. Hamilton frequently accompanies her son to physical therapy, and
she often works the night shift at a motel. (R. at 4); see Wrenn, 864 F.3d at 657. Late-night
shifts make her vulnerable to unwanted confrontation and the possibility of being attacked. (R.
at 4); see Wrenn, 864 F.3d at 657; Moore, 702 F.3d at 934;. Unfortunately, the County
arbitrarily stripped Hamilton’s right to defend herself by revoking her CCW Permit. See id.
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Columbia’s good cause requirement demands that applicants foresee the possibility of a future
threat, which is inconsistent with the purpose of the Second Amendment. See Heller, 554 U.S.
570. Hamilton has a guaranteed right to protect herself with a firearm before an attack – not
after. See Wrenn, 864 F.3d at 663.
II.

COLUMBIA’S GOOD CAUSE REQUIREMENT INFRINGES ON AN
INDIVIDUAL’S FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT, IS A TOTAL BAN, OR AT LEAST
FAILS THE STRICT SCRUTINY TEST.
Regulations challenged under constitutional law are subject to different standards of

review depending on the individual right. Wrenn, 864 F.3d. at 656. Strict scrutiny, the highest
standard, is applied when a law impedes on a specific right enumerated in the Bill of Rights.
United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 682 (4th Cir. 2010). The more lenient standard of
intermediate scrutiny merely requires courts to consider a substantial link to important
governmental interest. Id
Although Heller did not provide an appropriate standard of review, it left little doubt that
courts must evaluate firearm bans and regulations based on “text, history, and tradition,” not
balancing tests such as “strict or intermediate scrutiny.” Heller v. District of Columbia, 670 F.3d
1244, 1271 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). Because Columbia’s good cause
requirement impermissibly bans Hamilton’s fundamental right to keep and bear arms for selfdefense, no level of scrutiny is warranted. See id.
A. Good Cause Requirements Substantially Burden the Second Amendment.
To determine whether a regulation imposes a substantial burden on the Second
Amendment, some courts take a two-part approach. See Woollard, 712 F.3d 865; Chester, 628
F.3d at 680. Courts first consider whether the good cause requirement imposes a burden on
conduct falling “within the scope” of the Second Amendment’s guarantee. Chester, 628 F.3d at
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680. If the conduct was understood to be “within the scope” of the right when it was ratified,
courts then apply an appropriate form of means-end scrutiny. Id.
Columbia residents face significant hurdles when applying for a CCW Permit. CPC
§ 900. The Second Amendment does not guarantee some possibility of self-defense, it secures a
right for lawful carrying given the needs of law-abiding citizens. McDonald, 561 U.S. 742. This
is a right that Hamilton, and other Columbia citizens can never exercise, by the law’s very
design. See id. The right to bear arms is on equal footing with other fundamental rights, and the
law must leave responsible, law-abiding gun owners reasonable means to exercise this right. Id.
at 663. The good cause requirement burdens the rights of typical law-abiding citizens because it
leaves no ample alternative for self-protection. Wrenn, 864 U.S. at 662.
B. Columbia’s Good Cause Requirement Infringes on Core Second Amendment
Conduct and Is a Complete Ban.
As previously stated, this Court held that the Second Amendment fully applies to the
States under the Fourteenth Amendment. McDonald, 561 U.S. at 742.. In McDonald, this Court
considered whether a Chicago law violated the Second Amendment by prohibiting individuals
from possessing a firearm without a registration certificate. Id. at 750. Additionally, the
Chicago law prohibited registration of most handguns, which effectively banned handgun
possession by nearly all Chicago citizens. Id. This Court reasoned that the Framers considered
the right to bear arms among those fundamental rights necessary to our system of government.
Id. at 778. Moreover, the Second Amendment is not a “second-class right” subject to rules
different from the others in the Bill of Rights. Id. at 780.
1. Self-defense is a fundamental right.
Self-defense is an inherent right the County cannot suppress. Heller, 554 U.S. at 599. As
Heller clarified, self-defense is deeply rooted in our Nation’s history and long-standing
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traditions. Id. at 627. In Heller, this Court explored the origins of self-defense in English law
during colonial times, and when the Bill of Rights was ratified. Id. at 601. Many legal systems
recognized the right to self-defense as the “central component” of the Second Amendment. Id.
In fact, many colonial regulations mandated individuals to bear arms for “public-safety reasons.”
Id. Heller drew powerful evidence that self-defense is a fundamental right. Id. at 603.
Moreover, individuals must be able to protect themselves because police officers are not
legally obligated to protect citizens from private assaults. See Deshaney v. Winnebago Cty.
Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989) (holding that States have no legal duty to protect an
individual’s life, liberty, or property from private violence.); see also Town of Castle Rock v.
Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748 (2005) (holding that individuals have no constitutionally protected
property interest in having police enforce restraining orders).
In Gonzales, an estranged husband violated his restraining order by taking his three
children while they played outside their home. Id. at 752. Gonzales, the children’s mother,
contacted the police department but was told there was “nothing they could do.” Id. Gonzales
repeatedly begged the police officers to enforce the restraining order but they ignored her pleas.
Id. Hours later Gonzales’s husband arrived at the police station and opened fire. Id. Officers
returned fire and killed him. Id. Tragically, the three girls were found dead in the cab of her
husband’s pickup truck. Id. Gonzales sued the town of Castlerock for failing to properly
respond to her repeated reports that her estranged husband violated the terms of his restraining
order. Id. at 751. This Court ultimately held that the police officers have no duty to enforce
restraining orders. Id.
Because the state has no legal duty to protect Hamilton or her son, they cannot deprive
her the right to protect herself. See id. By requiring Hamilton to demonstrate good cause, the
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County is preventing her from doing the very thing the regulation is intended to do – allow law
abiding citizens to obtain a CCW Permit for self-defense. CPC § 900. As Gonzales illustrates,
unwanted confrontations are not limited to the home. See Gonzales, 545 U.S. at 751. If there is
no guarantee that a police officer will protect Hamilton from a violent attack, the County must
allow her to carry a firearm for her own personal defense. See id.
2. Columbia’s good cause requirement effectively bans law abiding citizens from
carrying firearms for self-defense.
Columbia Penal Code § 900.1(E) requires residents to submit their applications to the
Commissioner of the Department of Public Safety in the “county where the applicant resides.”
CPC § 900.1(E). Additionally, the statute provides that the Department of Public Safety “may,”
at its discretion, further define good cause provisions under CPC § 900.1(F)(4). CPC § 900.1(E).
The good cause requirement seeks to control a fundamental right by giving each county the
discretion to determine what constitutes “good cause.” See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567. The
liberty protected by the Constitution permits individuals to exercise their right to defend
themselves. See id. The County cannot arbitrarily decide whether individuals can exercise their
right to self-defense. See id.
The County’s justification for limiting law-abiding citizens from exercising their Second
Amendment right is indefensible. CPC § 900. The point of the Second Amendment is to ensure
that firearms are available to responsible, law-abiding citizens for self-defense. Wrenn, 864
F.3d. at 666. Yet, Columbia’s good cause requirement bars citizens from ever exercising this
right at all. See id. The plain language of CPC § 900 evinces a legislative intent to create a
system to issue CCW Permits to “prevent criminals from obtaining a permit to carry a firearm,
and allow law abiding residents to obtain a CCW Permit.” CPC § 900. However, by requiring
citizens to establish good cause prior to issuing a permit, Columbia effectively bans law-abiding
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citizens — not criminals — from carrying firearms. See McDonald, 561 U.S. at 750. And total
bans are struck down without applying any level of scrutiny because no analysis could sanction
eradication of a fundamental right. Wrenn, 864 F.3d. at 665.
Under Heller, absolute prohibitions on Second Amendment rights are always invalid.
Heller, at 570 U.S. 629. Hamilton chose to arm herself with the most popular weapon for selfdefense among Americans – a handgun. See id. As Heller noted, Americans consider the
handgun a “quintessential” weapon for self-defense. Id. Handgun preference stems from a
number of reasons such as: it is easier to store, it is easier to use than long guns, and can be
aimed at a burglar with one hand while contacting the police with the other. Id. Again, selfdefense is at the core of the Second Amendment. Id. Yet the good cause requirement prohibits
individuals from ever exercising this protected right without first establishing some
particularized need. See id. Accordingly, the good cause requirement is a ban, and no level of
scrutiny is necessary. See Wrenn, 864 F.3d. at 665; Heller, 554 U.S. at 628–29.
C. Even if the Good Cause Requirement is Not a Complete Ban, the Regulation
Burdens the Core of the Second Amendment, and Fails Strict Scrutiny.
Historically, this Court has determined that legislation or government actions which
discriminate on the basis of race, national origin, religion, and alienage are subject to strict
scrutiny. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (holding that courts must subject
legal restrictions which curtail civil rights of a single racial group to the most rigid scrutiny).
Additionally, strict scrutiny is applied where a “fundamental right” is threatened by law. See
e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1976) (reasoning that the fundamental right to marriage
should be subjected to the “most rigid scrutiny”).
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1. Columbia’s good cause requirement fails the strict scrutiny test.
To survive strict scrutiny, a government must prove there is a compelling state interest
behind the challenged policy, and that the law or regulation is narrowly tailored to achieve its
result. Wrenn, 864 F.3d at 656. The Wrenn Court properly held that carrying weapons for selfdefense falls within the “core” of the Second Amendment, therefore any restriction on the right
to carry arms violates the Second Amendment. Id at 657. In their analysis, the court considered
nineteenth-century cases which assumed the importance of “carrying” and “possessing.” Id. at
658. They concluded that the right to keep and bear arms stand equally, giving law-abiding
citizens means to exercise each. Id. at 663. Any regulation that intrudes on the “core” of a
constitutional right must be subject to strict scrutiny. See id. Assuming arguendo, that the
individual right to bear arms does extend beyond the home, the good cause requirement burdens
the core of the Second Amendment and fails strict scrutiny. See id.
Columbia aims to prevent criminals from obtaining a permit to carry a firearm, and allow
law-abiding residents to obtain a CCW Permit. CPC § 900. But the good cause requirement
interferes with law-abiding citizens’ right to protect themselves against violent criminals. CPC
§ 900.1 (F)(4). Under this statute, applicants must demonstrate good cause exists before the
County will issue a CCW Permit. Id. Good cause is demonstrated when an applicant, or a
member of the applicant’s family, is in harm’s way. CPC § 900.1(F)(4). Again, Hamilton
satisfied § 900.1(F)(4) because her son was brutally attacked during a home invasion. (R. at 3);
CPC § 900.1(F)(4). Although the County contends that Columbia has a compelling interest in
promoting public safety and preventing crime, Hamilton also has a compelling interest in
protecting herself and her family from further home invasions. (R. at 23); See Wrenn, 864 F.3d
at 665. According to the statute, a home invasion does not qualify as a sufficient threat to satisfy
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the good cause requirement. CPC § 900.1(F)(4). Good cause applies to the individual applicant,
and here, there is no evidence that the threat to Hamilton, or her son’s safety has ended. CPC
§ 900.1(F)(4).
2. Intermediate scrutiny does not apply.
The County incorrectly argues that intermediate scrutiny applies to Second Amendment
challenges. See Woollard, 712 F.3d 865. Intermediate scrutiny is less demanding than strict
scrutiny. See id. To pass intermediate scrutiny, the state must demonstrate that the challenged
statute is reasonably adapted to a substantial governmental interest. Id. Even with minimal
guidance as to whether the Second Amendment extends beyond the home, some circuits have
nonetheless wrongfully upheld good cause requirements by applying an intermediate scrutiny
standard. See Woollard, 712 F.3d 865; Kachalsky, 701 F.3d 81.
In Woollard, the Fourth Circuit assumed that the Second Amendment does apply to selfdefense beyond the home. Woollard, 712 F.3d 865. The court held that Maryland’s good cause
statute passed intermediate scrutiny because it served a substantial governmental interest to
protect public safety and prevent harm. Id. at 880. Comparably, the Second Circuit also held the
intermediate scrutiny standard as the appropriate standard of judicial review to Second
Amendment challenges. Kachalsky, 701 F.3d 81. In their analysis, the court assumed that the
Second Amendment “must have some application” in the context of carrying firearms in public.
Id. at 96–97.
Under intermediate scrutiny, the government has the burden of justifying the
constitutional validity of the regulation. Chester, 628 F.3d at 680. As the district court
recognized, Columbia may have a compelling general interest in promoting public safety and
preventing crime. (R. at 12); Wrenn, 864 F.3d at 665. However, this does not permit the state to
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restrict law-abiding citizens from exercising their right to possess a firearm outside the home for
purposes of self-defense. (R. at 12); Wrenn, 864 F.3d at 665. Accordingly, Columbia’s good
cause requirement fails any standard of review and is unconstitutional. See id.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Hamilton prays that this Court reverse the Fourteenth Circuit’s
order, and affirm the District Court’s judgment finding Columbia’s good cause statute
unconstitutional.
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